Introduction
The 37th Pacifi c Islands Forum (PIF) witnessed some painful political infl ammation in 2006. Its October annual heads of government meeting, held in Fiji, saw Australian prime minister John Howard face a Melanesian wall of resentment. This was instigated by a row that erupted over former Solomon Islands attorney general Julian Moti, an Australian lawyer facing extradition over child sex charges, who was sheltered by Solomon Island prime minister Manasseh Sogavare and his Papua New Guinea counterpart, Sir Michael Somare. With Australian impatience and willingness to assert aid conditionality, the temperature rose sharply. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer claimed that taxpayers deserved a far better return for what had been invested in the region.
1 (Currently, Australia provides more than A$300 million annual bilateral assistance to Papua New Guinea, and its outgoings to the Solomon Islands since 2003 are treble that amount.) A decision by the Howard government to stop a visit to Australia by Prime Minister Somare was widely viewed as a setback to neighbourly relations.
Political conditions in Fiji worsened as a showdown loomed between the commander of the Fiji military forces, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, and Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase's government, each demanding the other's resignation. Less spectacular, but as important, was growing public disaffection with the standards of governance evident in several Pacific Islands states. In response, local leadership groups have cried foul at having been blamed for historical and structural dependencies that they claim are beyond their responsibility or remedy.
Pressures mounted with a more overt, substantial Australian intervention into Melanesia, where, with New Zealand and other PIF administrations, the Howard government has played a dominant role since 2003 in the 15-nation Regional Assistance Missions to the Solomons (RAMSI). This unprecedented involvement stemmed from Canberra's belief that failing governance could expose the region to exploitation by activities associated with global terrorism.
2 Designed not just to return civil order and secure weapons surrender, RAMSI sought to initiate broader peace reconstruction through the installation of a corruptionfree, accountable, retrained and service-oriented public sector.
3 This was legitimised by the PIF's non-binding, but consensus-backed, Biketawa Declaration of 2000 committing members to 'good governance, which is the exercise of authority (leadership) and interactions in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, participatory, consultative and decisive, but fair and equitable'. 4 The declaration adumbrated a scale of options designed to remedy internal crises, including, should it prove necessary, last-resort intervention based on PIF unanimity and host-state consent.
What do these conditions suggest for future public sector development within Pacifi c Island states? Will this see decay and slippage (as threatens with Papua New Guinea's public health services losing ground in their battle against HIV/AIDS), or could the region's current * While accepting full responsibility for this paper, the author acknowledges the comments that Alastair Bisley provided on a draft. At one level, a grasp of the key issues at stake is simple: most Pacifi c Island citizens want improved nationwide basic services, an end to corruption, and educational facilities offering better employment and life chances. These calls have been variously conveyed through innumerable reports over the last two decades, this process itself adding a layer of complication. Now awash with recommendations, the region faces embarrassment that all this prescription has witnessed not just neglect or implementation failure, but actual deterioration in public sector standards. Lying at the core of this complication have been persisting claims and counter-claims over the cultural appropriateness of what is externally recommended -be it public agencies not beholden to traditional authority, programmes fostering gender neutrality, or rights-based entitlements. Elements of this division have permeated the PIF secretariat. Sometimes such concerns are genuine and justifi able; in other cases they provide cover for postponement or abuse of offi ce. At some stage, however (some beginnings are already detectable), the region will need to conduct its own diffi cult but salutary political battle over the nature and locus of domestic public responsibility. Central here is whether performance in offi ce will supplant kin or ethnic loyalty as the key driver in determining electoral outcomes.
In considering questions like this it is helpful to assess three avenues that have assumed salience in the relevant current policy discourse. 
The Pacifi c Plan
The PIF Pacifi c Plan, endorsed by governments in 2005, resulted from a designated task force, an oversight leadership group, the Forum secretariat, and feedback from relevant donor, offi cial and non-governmental interests. Good governance was included along with other key goals: economic growth (enhanced trade, infrastructure and private sector investment); sustainable development (poverty reduction, enhanced health, education, gender equality, cultural value protection); and security (maritime and aviation surveillance, border controls, law enforcement capacity, disaster management). Overall, the plan seeks to foster the bilateral and regional partnerships needed to support the institutional and resource commitments and political momentum needed to realise a range of specifi c goals.
There is an assumption that the plan will remain the focus for future regional and national policy development.
Necessarily, that will depend on the willingness of governments to assume fuller plan ownership, and to advance additional initiatives -including policy on migration and population growth.
So far as the Plan's governance objectives are concerned, three aspects warrant note. First, the objectives of enhanced transparency, accountability, participation, equity and effi ciency are designed to secure sustainable resource management objectives as well as function as ends in themselves. While not overtly prescriptive, this is an attempt to legitimise the activities of national organisations striving to rein in the patrimonial, clientbased and rent-seeking political conduct of élites which abuse public offi ce for private gain.
Second, locally produced working papers provided as supplementary to the published Plan offer fruitful insights into what is termed a 'governance defi cit'. 5 They highlight gaps between what is practised and understood, as distinct from what is required for public stewardship responsive to, and responsible for, the region's citizens and resources. Identifi ed is an interlocking problem where, for the most part, a lack of national political purpose, direction and leadership has aggravated, but also emerged from, serious defi ciencies in fi nancial resources, human capacity, societal fabric, and the operative transmission and communication of public objectives. In essence, these local reports suggest that the societal and institutional software needed to secure the region's democratisation is either missing or inadequate.
These problems spiral inwards in other respects. The weakened problem-solving capacity of central public sector agencies renders them even more useful as employment and welfare bailiwicks, where nothing is risked at work that might jeopardise a salary feeding an extended family or wantok. Small, isolated and weak economies, vulnerable to the vicissitudes of weather or external economic conditions (e.g. Kiribati and Nauru), readily treat the public service as a system of welfare (Larmour and Barcham, 2006, p.175) . Potential coordinating functions are weakened as parliamentarians engage in the direct delivery of services to their electoral clients, eroding political consideration of national needs.
6 In turn, a vacuum in national policy analysis or formulation places even heavier reliance upon technical assistance from donor and lending agencies. Samoa's relative success in coping with these problems has not been widely emulated (Delay, 2005 Other incentives encouraging hybridisation of governance functions -for example, fuller use of church and inter-faith processes -include the imperative need to confront a worsening spread of HIV/AIDS (Cullen, 2006) , and whole-of-government approaches looking to comprehensive security as a principle in guiding post-confl ict reconstruction on Bougainville. For any of these initiatives, however, the risk of failure remains high in the absence of functioning political rights.
In sum, while the Pacifi c Plan has addressed key public sector requirements under a good governance rubric, its standing as a creation of the intergovernmental process, and one largely fi nanced by Australia and New Zealand, remains subject to the vicissitudes of national compliance. For Iosefa Maiava, delivering the 2006 Siwatibau Memorial Lecture, support for the governance objectives of regional cooperation has been patchy and slow, possibly because it has been driven by outsiders 'with specifi c agendas and interests that are not always selfl ess'. 9 However, economic assistance programmes encouraging local entrepreneurship are more likely to avoid the charge of neo-colonialism than those that are dominated by public or private organisations of donors (Rondinelli and Montgomery, 2005, p.21) . Placing the PIF on a fi rmer statutory basis, a process currently in hand, could help foster procedures where, as in the OECD, prescriptive interchange between governments is diverse, routine, reciprocated and nonconfrontational.
Human rights
A rights-based approach to public sector reform in the Pacifi c is both more direct and less inhibited by the sovereignty sensitivities that were required to navigate the Pacifi c Plan. The capacity of rights issues to cause discomfort can prove positive by politicising demands for enhanced public sector capacities and deliveries of service. But what is needed to link advocacy pressures to observable institutional outcomes? Bridging functions include processes of community participation extending beyond voluntarism -indispensable though that remains -as well as legislative reform.
The Regional Rights Resource Team offers an example of a Pacifi c-based organisation that offers technical and policy advice in Fiji, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu. Its goals include the development of a human rights culture rather than project attempts to insert a rights-based approach into public sector conduct (Jalal, 2005) . Though this project has limited resources, it has benefi ted through the heightened salience of human rights in donor agendas, extending in some instances to the withholding of funds in the event of serious rights violations by potential recipients.
Corruption constitutes a major rights violation throughout the Pacifi c. Transparency International, with research funded by the Dutch government, has promoted attempts under its national integrity system to assess corruption and foster reform on a holistic basis. The key pillars of this system include: public awareness; public anti-corruption strategies; public participation; a fostering of 'watchdog' agencies, and appropriate roles for the news media; and judiciary, private sector and international cooperation. (2006), investigating the integrity system's application to Pacifi c Island states, found pillars in place for most functions, but an absence of monitoring capacities, and no country with 'an offi cial, dedicated, independent anti-corruption agency … though the Ombudsman Commission in Vanuatu (modelled on that in PNG) has the task of investigating and reporting on infractions of the mandatory "leadership code" affecting politicians and senior offi cials' (Larmour and Barcham, 2006, p.176 More broadly, the region's observers link rights needs to associated institutional development requirements. Peebles sees the lack of a human rights intergovernmental system as an indication of the immaturity of the PIF as an effective regional structure (Peebles, 2005, p.195) . He recommends the establishment of an Oceanic Human Rights Charter (Peebles, 2005, p.199-212) . Powles (2005, p.262) identifi es a need to fi nd 'ways of protecting and promoting tradition and culture, recognising that it is not static and is always evolving, while also acknowledging the universality of international human rights'. Hassall (2005, p.241 ) notes weak legislative capacity, including representative modes that ignore national need, abuse of position for private gain, incompetent law-making, ineffectual monitoring of the executive and, in totality, inadequate response to the needs of the people.
A far higher level of representation of women in the region's legislatures is essential (See Table 3 ).
At offi cial levels, reticence in the advancement of human rights has been evident, although a Pacifi c Island leaders meeting in Auckland in April 2004 pledged support to the PIF secretariat in enhancing the governance capacities of Forum members and related agencies by encouraging the creation of national human rights systems. However, tension persists between human rights advocacy and Pacifi c Island governments on grounds that criticism from within entails loss of face to foreigners, or on grounds of cultural relativism (Jalal, 2005, pp.5-7) . The establishment of national human rights bodies, in accordance with the Paris Principles, has been slow, as has ratifi cation of relevant international instruments -for example, compliance with International Labour Organisation codes on collective bargaining and worker organisation.
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In attempting to work directly with Pacifi c Islands governments on rights issues, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has affi rmed that objectives of good governance for sustainable growth, equitable development, lasting peace and social cohesion will not occur without an integration of human rights into development policies and legislative frameworks. The UNDP has also claimed that 'responsive and accountable institutions of governance are often the missing link between antipoverty efforts and poverty reduction ' (UNDP, 2000) . That provides useful guidance, but a more critical test of the salience of human rights is the extent to which the issue assumes conditionality within future European Union and other development assistance profi les.
Viewed in combination, human rights advancement, legislative reform (including public accounts committee functions), the representation of women, and civil society engagement will be severely tested in delivering the key policy outcomes identified in the 2000 Millennium Development Goals. These encompass poverty eradication; universal primary education; gender equality and women's empowerment; reduction of child mortality; improvement of maternal health; combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; and the development of global partnership in development.
Regrettably, implementation of these objectives has been hampered by the failure of Pacifi c governments to engage legislatures and civil society interests prior to their endorsement (Morgan, 2005, p.12) .
New Zealand's engagement
As security conditions deteriorated in Fiji, more seriously on Bougainville, and then in the Solomon Islands, New Zealand's focus on governance reform has sought to assist constitutional rehabilitation, judicial, police and rule of law functions, and some limited assistance to human rights advocacy through nongovernmental initiatives. Revealing a small increase, total New Zealand development assistance stood in 2006 at 0.27% of gross national income, which included increased disbursements to Melanesia.
In the last decade the most overt intervention by New Zealand for purposes of public sector refurbishment occurred in the Cook Islands. After the Cook Islands economy deteriorated sharply, in 1996 New Zealand instituted a wide-ranging programme through a series of 'tough love' austerity measures involving public sector downsizing, sale of state assets, a value-added tax, stimulation of private sector-led growth, and strengthening of fi nancial and economic management. (Batley, 2006, pp.193-6) .
The New Zealand Law Commission's October 2006 study Converging Currents: custom and human rights in the Pacifi c argues that the development of a Pacifi c jurisprudence will occur only as Pacifi c nations fi nd ways to better integrate custom and human rights as sources of law. Far from threatening custom, it is maintained, human rights can help it to develop and survive in a modern world. Such harmonisation, it is hoped, will work towards a cultural legitimating of human rights by advancing them in ways that reflect the values of Pacifi c societies. While the survey excludes issues relating to property rights, governance, corruption, selfdetermination, intellectual property and non-customary restorative justice from in-depth consideration, it displays a willingness to test the extent to which existing custom coexists with human rights regarding the current role of women in the Pacifi c. 12 Findings from this study warrant Pacifi c exposure and response.
12 Relevant citations from this study include: 'It is clear that Pacifi c women have real cause to consider their treatment under custom law to be unjust' (7.1); 'A belief that political leadership is the preserve of men is deeply ingrained and regularly expressed' (7.27); 'In some cases systematic bias is apparent in local government, particularly where this is in the hands of traditional leaders who are overwhelmingly male' (7.31); 'Violence against women is a major concern in the Pacifi c' (7.35); 'The evidence is compelling that custom law is substantially controlled by men and is often used to subordinate women' (7.56); 'Pacifi c women who speak out on human rights are generally comfortable with adapting it to refl ect human rights. Their main concern is to amend the male monopoly on custom's interpretation and application' (7.58); and 'We believe that the issue of women's rights may be the key to greater acceptance of human rights generally in the Pacifi c' (7.62).
Looking ahead
This paper has noted the ambivalence that persists throughout the Pacifi c Islands towards public sector reform. This reflects the continuing impact of a dichotomy bequeathed by decolonisation's awkward grafting of indigenous authority systems onto the 'legitimation of administrative structures which had been established by colonial powers for colonial ends' (Ghai, 1990, p.2) . While colonialism may not have stinted on the scaffolding of public bureaucracy, this did not foster institutional accountability, or function in an environment dedicated to providing the education and information systems needed to build a national citizenry. While needing continued external technical expertise, enhanced public sector capacity in the Pacifi c will not emerge without the bracing provided by representative institutions organised and motivated to hold executives to account, nor without systems of law operating to professional standards of independence.
The setting's diverse cultural and physical spaces can prove advantageous as an antidote to formulaic recommendations for public sector enhancement. Recognition and use of different local modalities could lessen current abuse of central political and administrative systems for private ends. Existing cultural and national rivalries need not obstruct the region's learning from itself. Samoa's relative success in handling development assistance through its stability, local highlevel championing, restriction on the number of donors, and integration with national planning warrants regional attention (Delay, 2005, pp.434-5) .
Advocates of public sector reform in the Pacifi c face diffi culties across a variety of fronts, as perceived external intervention consolidates primary loyalties among élites and power holders, who are disinclined to venture into the uncharted territory of greater recruitment of women into positions of public sector responsibility. Much of the existing public sector apparatus, concerned to maintain job security under conditions of high and continuing unemployment, remains averse to risktaking or utilising non-state interests for civil society engagement and service-delivery partnership purposes. That will have to change, however, in order to fulfi l agreed Millennium Development Goal targets.
Given the scant resources available to several small to very small Pacifi c Island entities, pooling and rationalisation of some functions -for example, in statistical services, border control technologies or telecommunications (as in the eastern Caribbean) -makes plausible sense. This will need stronger partnerships based on proven willingness to collaborate. Currently, however, there is no mistaking the caution evident throughout the region towards enhanced intergovernmental cooperation -whether from globalisation (a promise or a threat?), dominant Australian fi nancial and political capacity, or the role of even bigger players (the European Union, China). That attitudinal barrier is not insuperable, but reciprocity built on mutual respect will be required if it is to be overcome.
